

Efficient Selective Disclosure on Smart Cards using Idemix

Pim Vullers Gergely Alpár

Institute for Computing and Information Sciences – Digital Security
Radboud University Nijmegen

Conference on Policies & Research in Identity Management
8th April 2013

Attributes on Smart Cards

Privacy issues

- Smart cards are “Big Brother’s little helper” (Stefan Brands)
- With Oyster / OV-chipcard / Charlie / . . . , you tell who you are when you get on a bus, metro, train, . . .
- Identity-based solutions violate their users’ privacy (and increase identity-fraud risk)

Attribute-based credentials

- Attribute-based authorisation:
only provide the information which the system needs
- Example of attribute-based credentials (electronic wietpas):
 - card only says “I’m a **Dutch** citizen, and my age is **over 18**”



Outline

Introduction

Idemix Credentials

Smart Card Implementation

Performance Results

Summary




Credential-based System

The ideas

- Attributes: grouped in **credentials**
- Data minimisation: **selective disclosure**
- Unlinkability: **randomisation** & **zero-knowledge**

A credential

- Attributes
- Secret key
- Issuer's signature



Protocols

1 Credential issuance

- *Blind signature* generated by the issuer over the secret key of the card and the attributes to be issued.
- Issuer unlinkability

2 Attribute verification

I Proof generation / presentation

- *Selective disclosure* of the credential's attributes
- Randomisation of the issuer's signature

II Proof verification / authentication

- Verify the *zero-knowledge proof* using the issuer's public key
- Multi-show unlinkability

Idemix specifics

Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme

- Keys: $(n, S, Z, R_{0...l})$, (p', q') where $n = (2p' + 1)(2q' + 1)$
- Signature: (A, e, v) where $A = \left(\frac{Z}{S^v \prod_{i=0}^l R_i^{m_i}} \right)^{e^{-1} \bmod p'q'} \bmod n$

Credentials

- Secret key: m_0
- Attributes: $m_1 \dots m_l$

Verification

- Randomisation (with r): $A' = A \cdot S^r \bmod n$, $v' = v - e \cdot r$
- Zero-knowledge proof of e and undisclosed m_i

Outline

Introduction

Idemix Credentials

Smart Card Implementation

Performance Results

Summary



Smart Card Platforms

Java Card

- + High-level (object-oriented) programming language
- + Widely spread / high availability
- Limited cryptographic API / no mathematical API

MULTOS

- + Low-level access to the cryptographic co-processor
- + Proper cryptographic/mathematical API
- + Very flexible memory management
- Low-level language causes a steep learning curve.
- Limited amount of RAM available

Design of the System




Figure : System architecture for Idemix on a smart card.

- Terminal service translates IBM's Idemix commands and data types into APDU commands for smart card communication
- MULTOS implementation, limited by smart card characteristics, is 95% compatible with Idemix Library

Outline

Introduction

Idemix Credentials

Smart Card Implementation

Performance Results

Summary



Related Work on Smart Cards

Related work

- Bichsel et al. (IBM Research, 2009), ± 7.5 sec
Camenisch & Lysyanskaya anonymous credential system
- Sterckx et al. (KU Leuven, 2009), ± 3 sec
Direct anonymous attestation

Our previous results

- Batina et al. (RU Nijmegen, 2010), ± 1.5 sec
Hoepman et al. (RU Nijmegen, 2010), ± 0.6 sec
Self-blindable certificates of Verheul
- Mostowski and Vullers (RU, 2011), $\pm 0.5 - 0.9$ sec
U-Prove selective disclosure (2-5 attributes)



Issuance Performance






Figure : Credential issuance times (■: computation, ■: overhead).

Presentation Performance




(a) 2 stored attributes




(b) 5 stored attributes

Figure : Attribute verification times (■: computation, ■: overhead).

U-Prove Comparison



(a) Idemix



(b) U-Prove

Figure : Attribute verification times (■: computation, ■: overhead).

Summary

- *Efficient MULTOS implementation* of the Idemix technology
- *Multi-show unlinkability* of the credentials on the smart card
- Attribute-based credentials on smart cards are possible
- Major improvement over IBM's DAA implementation

Next steps:

- Studying other technologies
- Practicing with other platforms
- Making anonymous credentials *usable*: **IRMA**

IRMA – I Reveal My Attributes



Tuesday 9th April 2013

09:15 – 10:15 Second keynote session: Bart Jacobs

*Towards Practical Attribute-Based Identity Management:
the IRMA Trajectory.*

<https://www.irmacard.org/>

Demo



Questions

